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SUMMARY The Distributed Denial of Service attack
(DDoS) is one of the major threats to network security that ex-
hausts network bandwidth and resources. Recently, an efficient
approach Live Baiting was proposed for detecting the identities
of DDoS attackers in web service using low state overhead with-
out requiring either the models of legitimate requests nor anoma-
lous behavior. However, Live Baiting has two limitations. First,
the detection algorithm adopted in Live Baiting starts with a
suspects list containing all clients, which leads to a high false
positive probability especially for large web service with a huge
number of clients. Second, Live Baiting adopts a fixed thresh-
old based on the expected number of requests in each bucket
during the detection interval without the consideration of daily
and weekly traffic variations. In order to address the above lim-
itations, we first distinguish the clients activities (Active and
Non-Active clients during the detection interval) in the detec-
tion process and then further propose a new adaptive threshold
based on the Change Point Detection method, such that we can
improve the false positive probability and avoid the dependence
of detection on sites and access patterns. Extensive trace-driven
simulation has been conducted on real Web trace to demonstrate
the detection efficiency of the proposed scheme in comparison
with the Live Baiting detection scheme.
key words: Distributed Denial of Service, Group-testing, Intru-
sion detection, Change point detection
1. Introduction
One of the major threats to network security is the
distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack, which pre-
vents legitimate users from accessing their deserved ser-
vices [1]. According to the World Wide Web (WWW)
Security FAQ [2], a DDoS attack can be described as
an attack designed to render a computer or a network
incapable of providing normal services. The DDoS at-
tackers launch the attack at the network layer to con-
sume the network bandwidth or at the application layer
to attack the victim web servers. Since many effective
defense mechanisms have been proposed to protect the
network from bandwidth attack, recently the attackers
target the application layer and establish a more sophis-
ticated type of DDoS attack to disable the legitimate
clients from using this application.
There are two common methods to launch the
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Fig. 1 Simple scenario of DDoS Attack.
DDoS flooding attack in web service [3]. First, attack-
ers can consume the victim web server by sending a
query for large amount of data. Second, attackers can
cause the entire application to fail by overloading the
server with a huge number of requests as illustrated in
Fig.1. We focus on the second method because it is the
most widely used method to launch the DDoS attack
on web service.
The available defense schemes against DDoS at-
tack can be generally classified into four different cat-
egories: Attack Prevention, Attack Detection, Attack
Reaction and Attacker Traceback. Among them, At-
tack detection is the most widely investigated topic [4].
The intrusion detection schemes detect DDoS attack
based on either the signatures of known attacks (re-
ferred as Misuse Detection Schemes) or the feature(s)
of abnormal traffic behavior under the attack (known
as Anomaly Detection Schemes).
With regard to the target of detection schemes, we
distinguish between schemes that detect the attack (at-
tack detection schemes) and schemes that detect the
identity of the attacker (attacker detection schemes).
In comparison with the attack detection schemes, the
attacker detection schemes offer us several advantages.
First, if we can detect the identity of the attacker early,
all malicious packets can be dropped and the victim will
2
IEICE TRANS. ??, VOL.Exx–??, NO.xx XXXX 200x
gain more time to apply attack reaction mechanisms.
Second, we can detect the attacker without applying
the expensive traceback mechanisms. Finally, the de-
tection of source attack can prevent flooding attack
traffic from exhausting the network bandwidth and pro-
tect legitimate users from denying their services. How-
ever, detecting the identities of the attackers requires
high state overhead, which makes it inefficient for large
web service. Also, the detection should be fast and
has low probability of false positive, such that only the
malicious packets can be blocked.
Recently, an efficient approach Live Baiting was
proposed for detecting the identities of DDoS attackers
in web service based on the group testing theory [5].
Although Live Baiting uses low state overhead without
requiring either the models of legitimate requests nor
anomalous behavior, its detection algorithm has two
limitations:
• Clients activity: the detection algorithm assumes
that all clients of the web service are suspects dur-
ing the detection interval even if some of them are
inactive. Thus, it leads to a high false positive
probability especially for large web service with a
huge number of clients.
• Fixed threshold: the detection algorithm uses a
fixed threshold based on the expected number of
requests in each bucket during the detection inter-
val without the consideration of daily and weekly
traffic variations. Therefore, the detection deci-
sion is inaccurate and sensitive to site and access
pattern.
In order to address the above limitations, we first con-
sider the clients activity (Active and Non-Active clients
during the detection interval) and then propose a new
adaptive threshold based on the Change Point Detec-
tion, such that we can improve the false positive prob-
ability and avoid the dependence of detection on sites
and access patterns.
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 discusses the related work. In section 3, we
briefly review the Live Baiting detection scheme and
describe its limitations. Section 4 describes our detec-
tion scheme in detail. Section 5 provides the related
performance evaluation and comparison. Finally, Sec-
tion 6 concludes this paper.
2. Related Work
The available detection schemes for the DDoS attack
like schemes in [6], [7] and [8] focus on the detection of
the attack rather than the identities of the attackers.
The main idea of these schemes is to periodically com-
pare the current state of the system with a model of
normal system behavior, thus the attack traffic can be
detected. While these schemes are robust and simple,
they can not provide any information about the IP ad-
dress of the attacker. Therefore, they need to rely on
the expensive IP traceback mechanisms for the detec-
tion of attackers. Also, these schemes detect the attack
after the flooding attack packets pass through the net-
work and share the same paths as legitimate packets,
which significantly exhausts the network resources.
A few attacker detection schemes have been pro-
posed so far to detect the identity of the DDoS attack-
ers in web service. The CAPATCHA mechanism [9]
is now almost a standard security mechanism for de-
fending against attackers in websites. This mechanism
works through generating and grading a set of tests
that are solvable by human, but solving such tests usu-
ally beyond the capabilities of current computer pro-
grams. The main disadvantage of CAPTCHAs is that it
is not suitable for people with visual impair. Also, users
feel annoyed when they are interrupted by CAPTCHAs
problems, which always waste their time.
A session scheduling algorithm has been proposed
in [10] based on building profiles for normal client be-
havior with respect to session inter-arrival times, re-
quest inter-arrival times and session workload profile.
This scheme detects the suspicious requests based on
the content of the requests, but it needs to keep state
for each session, which makes the detection scheme it-
self vulnerable to the DDoS attacks.
The honeypot scheme [11] works by baiting the at-
tacker to install master or agent code within the hon-
eypot, thus masters or agents are trapped and their
packets can be dropped. Honeypot scheme is effective
in detecting hosts exploited by Internet worms. It is
notable, however, that honeypots are deployed on ma-
chines different than the ones they are supposed to pro-
tect, so sophisticated attacks can avoid the honeypots.
3. Overview of Live Baiting
3.1 Live Baiting Architecture
It is notable that among the attacker detection schemes
for web service proposed by now, the live baiting
scheme in [5] is the most promising one, because the
number of states needed by this scheme is in the order
of number of attackers not the total number of clients,
which makes it scalable for large service with a huge
client population. Also, this scheme does not require
modification inside the network, thus it is not expen-
sive to apply.
Since the web service can be divided into classes
(e.g, HTML, Images, Sound, Video, ...etc), so the
maximum aggregate service capacity C (measured by
req./sec.) of each class is fixed under normal condi-
tion. Under the DDoS attack, however, the number of
request packets from the attackers will be significantly
higher than the maximum capacity of the service, be-
cause the attackers send a lot of request packets to the
server at the same time to overwhelm it and drop any
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(b) The current live baiting detection algorithm
Fig. 2 Example of live biting with N=9 clients, T=6 tests and
d=2 attackers
incoming legitimate requests. Based on the previous
observation, the live baiting detection scheme uses the
group testing theory [12] to detect the identity of the
attackers among clients of a public web service.
To detect the attackers of web service with total
number of clients N using the group testing theory,
the live baiting scheme first divides the service class
capacity (e.g Images) into a number of virtual servers,
called buckets (T ). Then, design a binary group testing
matrix T ×N with rows corresponding to buckets and
columns corresponding to clients. According to this
matrix, each client receiving tokens will send requests
to his corresponding buckets only.
The Fig.2 illustrates a simple example of web
server with total N = 9 clients, the server has aggregate
capacity C = 9 req/sec and each legitimate client sends
1 req/sec. Two attackers d = 2 request the service at a
high rate of 2 req/sec for each.
The live baiting first divides the server capacity
into T = 6 buckets from A to F and construct the
6× 9 binary group testing matrix as shown in Fig.2(a).
When a matrix element at row i and column j is set
to 1, this indicates that client j is assigned to bucket
i (e.g. client 1 is assigned to bucket A and E). Then,
live baiting computes the threshold called High Water
Mark (HWM ) for the expected number of requests in
each bucket during the detection interval time as:
HWM =
C · P
T
(1)
where P is the length of detection interval. Let’s say
that the detection interval in this simple example is 10
sec, so the (HWM ) is 15. Finally, live baiting puts
all clients in the suspect list and counts the number of
requests in each bucket. If the number of requests in a
bucket exceeds a threshold, its corresponding test result
is labeled as positive (e.g. bucket A and E), otherwise
it is labeled as negative as shown in Fig.2(b).
The clients assigned to negative tests (i.e. buckets
with number of requests less than HWM) will be re-
moved, so here clients 2,3,5,7,8,9 will be removed and
the remaining clients in the suspect list will be detected
as attackers, so clients 1,4,6 will be detected as attack-
ers.
3.2 Limitations of the Available Detection Algorithm
in Live Baiting
The current detection algorithm of live baiting is quite
simple to apply. However, it has the following two lim-
itations:
1. During each detection interval time, the detection
algorithm in live baiting uses a fixed threshold
based on the expected number of requests in each
bucket in the detection interval. It is notable, how-
ever, that the number of requests in each bucket
may vary dramatically from time to time accord-
ing to the clients activity. To make the detection
algorithm much more generally applicable and its
deployment much easier, it is necessary to use a de-
tection method that is adaptive to daily and weekly
variations.
2. The detection algorithm adopted in live baiting
starts with the assumption that all clients are
in the suspect list and for each negative test, it
removes the clients assigned to the correspond-
ing bucket from the suspect list. Some legitimate
clients may be assigned to the same buckets of the
attackers, so they will be detected as attackers even
if they do not send any request during the detec-
tion interval time. This leads to a high false pos-
itive probability especially for large service with a
huge number of clients.
To illustrate the limitations of the detection algo-
rithm adopted in the live baiting , we still consider the
simple example shown in Fig.2. In this example, the
server can serve 9 clients, two of them are attackers
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Fig. 3 The flowchart of the new detection scheme inside one
bucket.
(client 1 and client 4). During the detection interval
time, some clients are Non-Active (i.e. do not send re-
quests), like 3, 6 and 9, and the attackers send requests
with higher rate than the legitimate clients, so their
corresponding buckets (bucket A and E) will exceeds
the HWM.
In this example, the live baiting detects all attack-
ers, so the false positive probability is 0. Notice that,
client 6 is detected as attacker even it is Non-Active
during the detection time, because it is assigned to the
same buckets with attacker number 1 (i.e. buckets A
and E), thus the false positive probability is 19 . There-
fore, the false positive probability will increase dramat-
ically in the current large web service with a huge num-
ber of clients, which makes this detection algorithm not
suitable for the large scale web service.
To address the above two limitations of the avail-
able detection algorithm, we propose here a new detec-
tion algorithm.
4. A New Detection Scheme
In this section, we first show the overall architecture
of our new scheme for the detection of flooding DDoS
attackers in the web service, then we introduce in de-
tails its two main modules, i.e. the Randomized Matrix
Construction and the detection Algorithm.
4.1 Overall Detection Architecture
The Fig.3 illustrates the flowchart of our proposed de-
tection scheme inside one bucket. The main idea of the
proposed scheme is to first use the same randomized
construction algorithm like live baiting to generate the
matrix used in the group testing. Then, each client is
assigned to one column in the matrix and is given a
set of tokens, one for each 1-bit in its column in the
matrix. Rather than regarding all clients as suspects
during each detection interval, we regard only the ac-
tive clients (client who send requests during this inter-
val time) as suspects and count their requests in each
bucket. To make the number of incoming requests in
each bucket independent of the site and the access pat-
terns, this number is normalized by the average number
of the incoming requests in each bucket in the previous
intervals. Finally, based on this normalized number of
incoming requests in each bucket, we propose a new
adaptive threshold based on the Change Point Detec-
tion method to make the detection decision.
4.2 Randomized Matrix Construction
A non-adaptive group test algorithm with total N
members, d estimate number of defective members and
T tests can be represented by a binary T×N matrixM
in which element (i, j) has entry 1 if and only if member
j is contained in test i.
The authors in [13] presented a simple random-
ized non-adaptive group testing matrix by setting each
M(i, j) = 1 with probability 1
d+1 and excluding a non-
defective member if it participates in one test with a
negative result. They proved that the algorithm can
detects all defective members with minimum false pos-
itive probability fp :
fp = (1−
1
d+ 1
(1−
1
d+ 1
)d)T (2)
From Equation (2), the number of tests T needed
to achieve a false positive probability fp can be com-
puted as [5]:
T =
log(fp)
log(1− 1
d+1 (1−
1
d+1 )
d)
(3)
To apply the idea of randomized matrix for de-
tecting DDoS attackers of web service, we divide the
aggregate server capacity for one service C into vir-
tual buckets and map these buckets to tests in the
matrix M . Clients of the server are mapped into the
matrix columns and each client is given a number of
secured tokens for each 1-bit in his corresponding col-
umn [5]. Thus, each incoming request to the web server
is marked with the corresponding token containing the
row index (bucket number) of its client. These tokens
are renewed periodically (e.g. every day) for security.
By this way, the server can drop any spoofed request
and each client is enforced to send his requests to his
buckets only, which make the detection more robust.
4.3 Detection Algorithm
The main function of the detection algorithm in the
proposed detection scheme is to first classify the clients
of the web service to active and non active clients.
NASHAT et al.: GROUP TESTING BASED DETECTION OF WEB SERVICE DDOS ATTACKERS
5
Then, a new adaptive threshold based on the change
point detection method is applied to make the detec-
tion decision.
4.3.1 Clients Activity
As described in Sect. 3.2 that in the real web service,
some legitimate users who do not send any requests
during the detection time may still be detected as at-
tackers if they share the same buckets with attackers in
the randomized matrix.
Since some clients may send requests and other
clients may not send requests in the same detection
interval time, the first step in the proposed detection
scheme is to classify the clients to Active and Non-
Active clients during each detection interval. By this
classification of clients during each detection interval
time, only active members (not all members as the live
baiting scheme) will be in the suspect list. Thus, we
can reduce the false positive probability and make our
scheme more efficient and generally applicable for large
web service with a huge number of clients.
For the example shown in Fig.2(b), all the clients
are classified as active clients except clients 3,6,9, be-
cause they do not send requests during the detection
interval time. Thus clients 1,4 will be detected as at-
tackers and the false positive probability will be zero.
Based on the the previous randomized matrix, in
every detection interval n, the detection algorithm at
the server works as follows:
1. Check the token of every received request packet
and drop the request if it is not valid or comes from
attacker already detected before (i.e client in the
block list). Otherwise:
• Classify this client as active member.
• Put the IP address of this client in the suspect
list.
• Increment the corresponding bucket of this re-
quest by one.
2. Do Step 1) for any incoming request.
Notice that, the DDoS attackers overloading the
server with a huge number of requests, so they are
always classified as active members during the attack
time.
4.3.2 The Change Point Detection
The detection algorithm in live baiting uses a fixed
threshold during each detection interval time based on
the expected number of requests in each bucket in the
detection interval. It is notable, however, that the num-
ber of requests in each bucket may vary dramatically
from time to time according to the clients activity.
Therefore, we propose here a new adaptive threshold
based on the change point detection, such that we can
avoid the dependence of detection on sites and access
patterns.
The change point detection method [14] is gener-
ally adopted to test if an observed time series is statisti-
cally homogeneous. When a change occurs to a homo-
geneous series (i.e., a sudden change from homogeneous
to heterogeneous), the change point detection can be
used to efficiently determine the point in time when this
change happens. The main function of change point
detection in our new scheme is to decide if a bucket
contains attacker, and if yes, to find the point in time
when the attack happens.
Let Xi
n
denote the number of requests in bucket i
within the detection interval n. To eliminate the de-
pendence of Xi
n
upon both the observation time and
the number of active clients in each bucket, Xi
n
should
be normalized by the mean M i
n
of incoming requests
during an observation period. Let M¯ i
n
denote the esti-
mation ofM i
n
based on the number of requests in first n
observation periods. Then the M¯ i
n
can be estimated in
real time and update periodically from the Exponential
Weighted Moving Average (EWMA) of previous mea-
surements:
M¯ i
n
= βM¯ i
n−1 + (1− β)X
i
n
(4)
where β is the EWMA smoothing factor lying strictly
between 0 and 1.
Define X˜i
n
= Xi
n
− M¯ i
n−1, then X˜
i
n
is independent
of the weekly and daily variation in each buckets. Thus,
we can consider X˜i
n
as a stationary random process and
its mean value will change when the DDoS flooding at-
tack occurs in the bucket. To detect the point in time
when such change in the mean value occurs in Xi
n
, we
use the change point detection based on non paramet-
ric CUSUM algorithm [15], because the complexity of
this algorithm is very low and this algorithm fits our
requirement of sequential and non-parametric test for
X˜i
n
.
Under normal operation, the mean value of X˜i
n
is
zero (i.e M i
n
= 0). When the DDoS attack occurs,
however, the mean value of X˜i
n
in attacked buckets will
become a large positive value of M i
n
. Since the val-
ues of M i
n
can not be known beforehand, it can be
approximated with αM i
n
, where M i
n
can be adopted
periodically using the exponential weighted moving av-
erage and α is an amplitude percentage parameter of
increase of the mean rate after the attack has occurred.
Let
Y i
n
= [Y i
n−1+
αM¯ i
n−1
σ2
+(Xn−M¯
i
n−1−
αM¯ i
n−1
2
)]+ (5)
where x+ equals to x if x > 0 and 0 otherwise. i.e., the
maximum continuous increment until time n. A large
Y i
n
is a strong indication of DDoS attack in the bucket
i. Thus, we can define the corresponding decision rule
as [16]:
6
IEICE TRANS. ??, VOL.Exx–??, NO.xx XXXX 200x
dN (Y
i
n
) = I(Y i
n
> h), (6)
where h is the decision threshold and I(·) is the indi-
cator function at observation period, which gives value
‘1’ to indicate an attack and ‘0’ to indicate a normal
condition.
If the value of Y i
n
in bucket i exceeds the h value,
its corresponding test is marked as positive. Otherwise,
its corresponding test is marked as negative. Then, for
each negative test, we remove all clients assigned to
these tests from the suspect list. Finally, the rest of the
suspect are detected as attackers and added to the block
list.
4.3.3 Parameter Specification
To apply the change point detection method based on
CUSUM algorithm, we need to specify four parameters
β, the EWMA factor; α, the most probable percentage
of increase of the mean rate after the attack; n, the
detection interval time and h, the threshold.
In the DDoS attack, the number of requests in each
attack bucket will suddenly increase during the attack
time. To make our detection scheme sensitive to this
rapidly change in the number of incoming requests in
each bucket, the value of the smoothing factor β in
the EWMA should be close to 1 to give more weight
to the recent observations. Also, the authors in [15]
mentioned that the best performance of the CUSUM
algorithm is achieved when β is in the interval [0.95,
0.99]. Therefore, we choose β = 0.98 in our proposed
method.
The CUSUM algorithm requires E(X˜i
n
) = 0 (i.e
M i
n
= 0) before the attack and E(X˜i
n
) > 0 after the
attack (i.e αM i
n
> 0). Therefore, the parameter α in-
tuitively corresponds to the most probable percentage
of the increase of the mean incoming requests rate in
each bucket after attack has occurred. If we set α close
to 1, we can get a low false positive probability at the
cost of a bad sensitivity. In contrast, when α is set
close to 0, a very good sensitivity is guaranteed at the
expense of a relatively high false positive probability.
Thus, in general the α should be set to a value around
0.5 to achieve a good trade off between sensitivity and
false positive probability. Here, we set α as 0.5 in our
simulation.
For the detection interval time n, it should not be
too long since the bursty legitimate request arrivals in
a long detection period may significantly increase the
false positive probability [5]. Therefore, the n should
be chosen from a small range (say, in the range of [5,20]
seconds as discussed in [15]) to guarantee the best per-
formance of the CUSUM algorithm. We adopt n = 20
seconds in our simulation.
The basic principle for determining the threshold
h of the CUSUM algorithm is to find as small value
as possible for it to achieve a high detection sensitiv-
ity while guaranteeing no false alarm happens during
normal traffic behavior. Thus, to determine the best
value of h, we need first compute the value of Yn for
{n = 0, 1, ..} for normal traffic, then we just set the
threshold h as a value that is just larger than the max-
imum value of Yn, so no false alarm is reported for
normal traffic while a good sensitivity is guaranteed.
Based on this principle, we determined h = 1 in our
simulation.
5. Performance Evaluation
In this section, we investigate that as compared with
the live baiting detection scheme how much the detec-
tion efficiency and false positive probability can be fur-
ther improved by considering the clients activity and
using the change point detection.
5.1 Simulation Environment
The performance evaluation was conducted by trace-
driven simulation experiments, where real web trace
were adopted in our simulation. This trace contains
two hours worth of all HTTP requests to the tangthu-
vien forum WWW server [17]. The logs were collected
from 10:00:00 on Wednesday, January 14, 2009 through
12:00:00 on Wednesday, January 14, 2009. In our sim-
ulation, we use the image service class (gif, jpg, jpeg,
xbm and bmp) with aggregate request processing ca-
pacity C = 150 req./sec with total number of clients
N = 15000.
To study the performance of our new scheme under
the DDoS attack, we conducted the simulation by mix-
ing the trace of normal traffics with the flooding traffic
with aggregate attack rates 150 req./sec, 200 req./sec
and 300 req./sec with different number of attackers.
The simulation time of each run is 1000 sec and the
attack started at 250 sec and ended at 750 sec. In
our proposed scheme, we set the number of buckets
T = 1000, thus randomized non-adaptive group testing
matrix is 1000× 15000. The parameters we considered
for the change point detection are α = 0.5, h = 1,
β = 0.98 and the detection interval time is n = 20 sec
as described in details in Section 5.
5.2 Detection Efficiency
We first examined the detection efficiency of both our
scheme and the live baiting detection scheme. In our
simulation here, the attack rate is 200 req./sec, the
number of attackers x = 50 and the estimate number
of attacker is d = 50 as well.
We summarize the dynamics of incoming request
packets distribution in normal and attack traffic in
Fig.4. We can easily see from Fig.4 that the number
of incoming request packets significantly increase under
the DDoS flooding attack during the attack time (i.e.
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Fig. 4 The dynamics of incoming requests packets
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Fig. 5 The dropped incoming requests packets after deploying
the Live Baiting and the New schemes
from t=250 sec to t=750 sec).
Fig.5 shows the number of dropped packets of in-
coming request packets after deploying the live bait-
ing detection scheme and the new detection scheme
when both of them guarantee zero false negative prob-
ability. This figure shows clearly that the live baiting
detection scheme dropped more request packets than
the proposed scheme even both of them detected all
the attackers. For example, at time t = 400 sec, the
live baiting scheme dropped more than 4100 request
packets while the new proposed scheme dropped about
3850 request packets. We can also see from Fig.5 that
the dropped request packets of the live baiting scheme
at time t = 560 sec is more than 4300 request pack-
ets, while the the dropped request packets of the new
scheme is about 4000 request packets. This is because
the number of blocked legitimate clients of the proposed
scheme is less than the blocked legitimate clients of the
live baiting scheme with the same false negative prob-
ability.
This figure shows that the dropped packets of both
our new scheme and the live baiting scheme are sim-
ilar in some detection intervals. This is mainly due
to that the difference between their dropped packets
comes only from the active legitimate clients in their
block lists, because the false negative probability of the
two schemes in this figure is zero (i.e. the block list
of the two schemes contains all the attackers). Since
the false positive probability of our scheme is less than
the false positive probability of the live baiting scheme,
the difference between their dropped packets is mainly
determined by the number of active legitimate clients
in the block list of the live baiting scheme at each de-
tection time. When most of legitimate clients in the
block list of the live baiting scheme are active (e.g. at
time t = 400), this difference becomes big. In contrast,
when most of legitimate clients in the block list of the
live baiting scheme are inactive (e.g. at time t = 660),
the difference becomes small.
5.3 False Positive Probability
To study the performance of the two schemes, we also
conducted the simulation on their false positive prob-
ability (FP ) when both of them guarantee zero false
negative probability. The simulation was conducted
with different number of attackers and different attack
rates 150 req./sec, 200 req/sec and 300 req/sec. To
further clearly show the contribution of the two en-
hancements of our proposed scheme (i.e. client activity
and adaptive threshold), we also conducted the simula-
tion with the consideration of only client activity and
with the consideration of both client activity and adap-
tive threshold. The corresponding results are shown in
Fig.6, Fig.7 and Fig.8, respectively.
Fig.6 shows the comparison of the false positive
probability for attack rate 150 req./sec. Fig.6 indi-
cates that the new scheme with the consideration of
only clients activity already achieves lower false posi-
tive probability than the previous live baiting scheme,
but this false positive probability can be further signifi-
cantly reduced after applying also the adaptive thresh-
old, especially for large scale service with high number
of clients. For example, the new scheme with the con-
sideration of only clients activity succeeds to detect 10
attackers with 0.011 false positive probability, and this
probability is further reduced to 0.003 after applying
the adaptive threshold, while the false positive proba-
bility of live baiting is about 0.012. We can also easily
see that when the number of attacker is 50, our new
scheme can guarantee the same false positive probabil-
ity (i.e 0.003), while the live baiting results in an 0.014
false positive probability.
We also compared the false positive probability of
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Fig. 7 Attack rate 200 req/sec
the two detection schemes under attack rate 200 req/sec
in Fig.7. We can easily see from the figure that our
scheme with clients activity can detect all 20 attackers
with 0.011 false positive probability, while it achieves
0.003 false positive probability when further using the
adaptive threshold. On the other hand, the live baiting
scheme can achieve about 0.0119 false positive proba-
bility to detect the 20 attackers.
Fig.8 further confirms the similar results of Fig.6
and Fig.7 under attack rate 300 req./sec with different
number of attackers.
5.4 Number of Buckets
Finally, we study how the number of buckets (T ) affects
the false positive probability of the two schemes. We
conducted simulations of both our scheme and the live
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Fig. 8 Attack rate 300 req/sec
1000 1500 2000
0.000
0.005
0.010
0.015
0.020
Fa
ls
e 
Ps
iti
ve
 P
ro
ba
bi
lity

Number of Buckets
 Live Baiting
 New Scheme
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baiting detection scheme with different number of buck-
ets under attack rate 300 req/sec and 100 attackers.
The comparison in Fig.9 demonstrates that to achieve
the same false positive probability, our scheme needs
smaller number of buckets (T ) than the live baiting
scheme. For example, the new scheme with 1000 buck-
ets achieves a false positive probability less than 0.004,
while the corresponding false positive probability of live
baiting is about 0.02.
We can also easily see from the figure that when
the number of buckets is 2000, our new scheme can
guarantee about 0.0014 false positive probability, while
the live baiting scheme achieves 0.0047 false positive
probability. Thus, the live baiting scheme doubles the
number of buckets (i.e. from T = 1000 to T = 2000) to
achieve the same false positive probability of the pro-
posed scheme (i.e. FP = 0.004). Therefore, our scheme
can significantly reduce the number of buckets (T ) re-
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quired to achieve the same false positive probability.
6. Conclusion
We proposed a new detection scheme for web service
DDoS attackers which can increase the detection ef-
ficiency and significantly decrease the false positive
probability in comparison with the available detection
scheme. Rather than putting all clients in the suspect
list during the detection interval time, we first clas-
sify the clients into active and non active clients and
then use an adaptive threshold based on the change
point detection to make the final detection decision in
each bucket, such that we detect all the attackers of
the web service with low false positive and almost zero
false negative. Simulation results demonstrate that by
adopting the new detection algorithm, we can greatly
improve the detection efficiency.
As the first step, in this work we investigated the
effectiveness of the proposed scheme based on only one
large-scale real web trace. In the future, it is quite inter-
esting to test the proposed scheme under other large-
scale web traces to have a full understanding on its
performance.
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